白宫新闻秘书办公室
2013年5月23日
国防大学(National Defense University)
华盛顿特区麦克奈尔堡(Fort McNair)
美国东部夏令时间下午2:01
总统: 各位下午好。请就坐。
非常荣幸回到国防大学。麦克奈尔堡自1791年起就有美国戎装军人驻扎——在共和国的最初岁月执行守卫,在21世纪的今天思索军事未来。
两个多世纪以来,美国的建国文献将这个国家凝聚为一体,界定了我们作为美国人的含义;这些文献也是引导我们经历各种变化的指南针。战争与和平的内涵不曾改变。美国人对于战争怀有深刻的矛盾心理,但我们为赢得独立而进行的战争让我们知道,要自由就必须付出代价。从南北战争(Civil War)到反法西斯斗争,直至旷日持久的朦胧冷战(Cold War),战场发生了改变,技术有了发展。但是,我们对宪法原则的承诺经受住每一场战争的考验,每一场战争最终得以告终。
随着柏林墙(Berlin Wall)倒塌,海外展现着新的民主的曙光,国内迎来了十年的和平与繁荣。一时间,21世纪似乎将成为安宁的时代。然而,2001年9月11日将我们从这种安逸自得中震醒。在那个阳光明媚的早晨,烈火浓烟、金属尘埃铺天而至,夺走了我们身旁数千人的生命。这是一种不同的战争:没有敌军登陆我们的海岸,我们的军队不是首要目标;它来自一群要最大程度杀害平民百姓的恐怖主义分子。
由此,我国进入战争状态。如今,我们的战争已经持续超过十年。我不准备在此回顾整个历史。显然,我们迅速将“基地”组织(al Qaeda)赶出了阿富汗,但随后转移注意力,在伊拉克打响了新的战争。这对我们打击“基地”组织、我们的世界地位以及——迄今为止——我们在一个关键地区的利益产生重大了后果。
与此同时,我们加强了防御——坚定目标、加强交通安全、为执法部门提供防范恐怖活动的新工具。这些改变大多数合理有效。有些造成了不便。但还有些,例如扩大监视,则提出了在安全利益和隐私价值观之间如何平衡的难题。而且在某些情况下,我认为我们损害了我们的基本价值观——即在审讯敌方人员时使用酷刑,以及以违背法治的方式拘留人员。
因此在我上任后,我们扩大了打击“基地”组织的战争,但我们也力求改变路线。我们毫不留情地打击“基地”组织领导层。我们结束了在伊拉克的战争,让将近15万军人返回家园。我们在阿富汗实行新的战略,增强了对阿富汗武装力量的培训。我们明文禁止了酷刑,申明我们对民事法庭的承诺,着力让我们的政策合乎法治,并且扩大了我们与国会的协商。
如今,乌萨马·本·拉登(Osama bin Laden)已经死亡,他手下的大多数高级头目也遭到同样下场。再也没发生过针对美国的大规模袭击,我们的国土更加安全。我们让更少的部队置身险境,而且在未来19个月内,他们将陆续返国。我们的同盟强大,我们的世界地位亦是如此。总之,由于我们的努力,我们变得更加安全。
毫无疑问,我们的国家仍然受到恐怖主义分子的威胁。从班加西(Benghazi)到波士顿(Boston),不幸的悲剧在不断提醒我们这一事实。但我们必须认识到,自9/11事件以来,威胁发生了改变和转化。基于十年积累的经验,如今是我们向自己提出一些尖锐问题的时候了,即当今威胁的性质是什么,以及我们应该如何应对。
这些问题关系到每一个美国人。
过去十年里,我们国家在战争上耗资逾1万亿美元,这使我们的赤字激增并制约了我们的国内建设能力。我们的军人及其家人为国家作出了巨大牺牲。近7000名美国人献出了生命。更多的人将一部分肢体留在了战场,或带着战争的阴影回到家乡。从我们使用无人机到拘留恐怖主义嫌疑分子,我们现在的决策将界定我们将给后代留下什么样的国家——和世界。
因此,美国正处于十字路口。我们必须界定这场斗争的性质和范围,否则我们将被它界定。我们必须记住詹姆斯·麦迪逊(James Madison)的警告:“没有哪个国家可以在持续的战争中保持自己的自由”。无论我或是任何一位总统,都不能保证完全挫败恐怖活动。我们永远无法消除某些人心中的邪恶,也无法杜绝危及我们开放社会的一切危险。但是,我们能做的——我们必须做的——是,捣毁对我们构成直接危险的网络,减少新团伙站住脚的可能,同时维护我们所捍卫的自由和理想。要确定这一战略,我们必须让决策基于艰苦习得的智慧而不是恐惧。而这要以理解我们当前所面临的威胁为起点。
如今,阿富汗和巴基斯坦的“基地”组织的核心势力正节节败退。其余成员在用更多时间考虑他们自己的安全,而不是策划攻击我们。班加西或波士顿的袭击并非来自他们。自9/11事件以来,他们未能在袭击美国本土中得逞。
我们所看到是“基地”组织各路分支的出现。从也门到伊拉克,从索马里到北非,今天的威胁更为分散,“基地”组织阿拉伯半岛(Arabian Peninsula)分支——阿拉伯半岛基地组织(AQAP)——是最积极策划攻击我国本土的一个势力。虽然阿拉伯半岛基地组织没有哪次攻击接近9/11事件的规模,但他们一直在密谋恐怖活动,例如企图在2009年圣诞节炸毁一架飞机。
阿拉伯世界的动荡也使极端主义分子在利比亚和叙利亚等国取得立足之地。但这些也与9/11事件不同。在有些情况下,我们在继续对抗像真主党(Hezbollah)这样由国家资助的恐怖主义网络为实现政治目标而进行的恐怖活动。其他一些组织则只是当地民兵或极端主义分子组成的对夺取领土感兴趣的乌合势力。虽然我们对这些组织可能构成跨国威胁的迹象保持警惕,但他们大多数集中在其大本营所在国家和地区活动。这意味着我们将面临像我们在班加西或者像在阿尔及利亚英国石油公司(BP)石油设施看到的那种更为地方化的威胁,这些地方势力——也许与区域网络有着松散的联系——不时发动针对西方外交人员、公司和其他软目标的攻击,或诉诸绑架和其他犯罪集团行动来为其活动提供资助。
最后,我们面临来自美国国内激进分子的切实威胁。无论是威斯康星州锡克庙(Sikh Temple)的冷枪手、得克萨斯州撞楼的飞机、还是在俄克拉荷马市(Oklahoma City)联邦大厦(Federal Building)造成168人丧生的极端分子,美国在历史上经历过多种形式的暴力极端主义。精神失常或孤僻离群者——通常是美国公民或合法居民——可能造成巨大的伤害,尤其是在受到暴力圣战思想鼓动时。极端主义的吸引看来成为导致胡德堡(Fort Hood)射击案和波士顿马拉松(Boston Marathon)爆炸案的因素。
因此,这就是当前的威胁——致命但能力较小的“基地”组织分支;对在国外的外交设施和企业的威胁;本土出现的极端主义分子。这是未来的恐怖主义。我们必须严肃对待这些威胁,尽一切可能对抗这些威胁。但我们在制定应对措施时必须认识到,这种威胁的规模与我们在9/11事件以前面临的那些攻击非常相似。
20世纪80年代,在我们驻贝鲁特(Beirut)大使馆、在我们驻黎巴嫩(Lebanon)的海军陆战队军营(Marine Barrack)、在一艘海上游轮上、在柏林(Berlin)的迪斯科舞会上以及在飞越洛克比(Lockerbie)上空的泛美航空公司(Pan Am)航班——103号航班(Flight 103)——上,美国人都因恐怖主义而遭受生命损失。20世纪90年代,在世界贸易中心(World Trade Center)、在我们位于沙特阿拉伯的军事设施以及在我们驻肯尼亚大使馆,也有美国人被恐怖主义夺走了生命。这些袭击都很残酷,都造成生命损失,而且我们知道,如任其发展,这些威胁会愈演愈烈。但是,如果处理得明智得当,这些威胁将不必上升到我们在9/11事件前夕所见到的程度。
此外,我们必须认识到,这些威胁并非产生于真空。我们所面对的大多数恐怖主义——尽管并非全部——都是由一种共同的意识形态所驱动——一种某些极端主义分子认为的伊斯兰教(Islam)与美国和西方相冲突的信念,以及认为对包括平民在内的西方目标发起暴力是为了追求一个更大的事业。当然,这种意识形态建立在谎言之上,因为美国并不与伊斯兰教交战。这种意识形态遭到经常沦为恐怖袭击受害者的绝大多数穆斯林的否定。
尽管如此,这种意识形态依然存在,而在一个思想和图像可以即时传向全球的时代,我们应对恐怖主义不能仅仅依靠军事或执法力量。我们需要用国家实力的所有元素来赢得意志的战争,理念的战争。因此,我今天想在这里讨论的是这样一个全面的反恐战略的内容。
首先,我们必须完成击败“基地”组织及其相关势力的使命。
在阿富汗,我们将完成把阿富汗的安全交由阿富汗人负责的过渡。我们的军队将归国。我们的作战使命将结束。我们将与阿富汗政府共同努力训练安全部队,并且维持一支反恐部队,确保“基地”组织再也不可能重建安身之地来对我们或我们的盟友发起攻击。
在阿富汗之外,我们一定不能将我们的努力定义为无止境的“全球反恐战争”,而是要作为一系列持久而有针对性的努力,旨在瓦解威胁美国的暴力极端主义分子的具体网络。在许多情况下,这将涉及与其他国家建立伙伴关系。巴基斯坦已经有数千军人在打击极端主义分子的斗争中丧生。在也门,我们正在为已从阿拉伯半岛基地组织手中夺回领土的安全部队提供支持。在索马里,我们帮助非洲国家联盟将青年党(al-Shabaab)赶出其盘踞的地方。在马里,我们向以法国为首的干预行动提供军事援助,以在马格里布(Maghreb)击退“基地”组织,并帮助马里人民重新掌握自己的未来。
我们许多最佳的反恐合作使我们能够收集和共享情报,逮捕并起诉恐怖分子。正因为如此,在也门近海被逮捕的一名索马里恐怖主义分子现在得以被关押在纽约一处监狱。正因为如此,我们能够与从丹麦到德国到英国的欧洲盟友共同挫败阴谋。正因为如此,经沙特阿拉伯收集到的情报帮助我们阻止了一架货运飞机在大西洋上空爆炸。这些伙伴关系卓有成效。
然而,尽管我们非常希望拘留和起诉恐怖主义分子,但有时无法采用这种方法。“基地”组织及其同伙企图在地球某些最遥远和条件极其恶劣的地方建立据点。他们躲避到偏远的部落地区。他们隐藏在洞穴和围居区内。他们在空旷的沙漠和嶙峋的山地中训练。
在有些地方——例如索马里和也门某些地区——可及国家权力极其薄弱有限。在另一些情况下,国家缺乏采取行动的能力或意愿。美国也不可能派遣特种部队(Special Forces)去抓获每一个恐怖主义分子。即使这种方法有可能,在有些地方也会给我们的部队和当地平民带来重大风险——例如在有些地方,要攻入恐怖主义分子的驻地不可避免地要与周围的部落社区交火,而这些社区对我们没有构成威胁;还有些时候,派遣美国军队进入可能会引发重大国际危机。
换句话说,我们在巴基斯坦对付乌萨马·本·拉登的行动不能成为常规。当时的风险巨大。尽管我们倾向于抓获,但鉴于我们的人员必将面临抵抗,抓获的可能性很小。我们没有遇到平民伤亡或卷入大范围交火的情况,这证明了我们特种部队的计划精密和他们的专业能力,但也依靠了一定的运气。而且行动得到了阿富汗境内大规模基础设施的支持。
即使那样,这给我们与巴基斯坦的关系所带来的代价——以及巴基斯坦公众对领域被入侵产生的反弹——都极为严重,以至我们现在才正在开始重建这一重要的伙伴关系。
因此,正是在这样的背景下,美国对“基地”组织及其相关势力采取了致命的有针对性的行动,包括动用遥控飞机,即通常所称的无人机。
正如以前的武装冲突一样,这种新技术提出了一些深刻的问题——涉及谁是目标,为什么;涉及平民伤亡及树新敌的风险;涉及在美国和国际法律下实施这种打击的合法性;涉及承担责任和道义。因此,让我谈一谈这些问题。
首先,我们的行动是有效的。不是仅听我说。我们从在本·拉登的藏身之处获得的情报中发现,他曾写道:“我们可能在敌人的空袭下失去后备资源。我们无法用炸药对抗空袭。” “基地”组织行动人员的其他通信也证实了这一点。数十名技术娴熟的“基地”组织指挥官、教官、炸弹制造者和行动人员均被清理出局。本来针对国际航班、美国交通系统、欧洲城市和我们在阿富汗的驻军的阴谋被我们挫败。简而言之,这些打击行动挽救了生命。
此外,美国的行动是合法的。我们在9/11遭到袭击。一周之内,国会以压倒性多数授权使用武力。根据国内法和国际法,美国与“基地”组织、塔利班(Taliban)及其同伙势力处于交战状态。我们对这个组织开战,而如果我们不首先阻止他们,这个组织现在会尽其一切可能最大程度的杀害美国人。因此,这是一场正义的战争——作为最后的手段、以适度的方式、为自卫而进行的战争。
然而,随着我们的斗争进入新阶段,美国对自卫的合法伸张并不能被作为一劳永逸的定论。说一项军事策略是合法的,或者甚至是有效的,并不等于说其在任何情况下都是明智或道义的。人类进步既带给我们向地球另一端出击的技术,也要求具有对这一威力予以约束的克制——否则便可能导致滥用。为此,过去四年来,本政府积极努力制定一个指导我们使用武力打击恐怖主义分子的框架——要求具有明确的方针、监管和问责,这些已在我昨天签署的《总统政策指导》(Presidential Policy Guidance)中得到规范。
在阿富汗战区,我们必须——并且将——继续支持我们的军队,直到2014年底完成过渡。这意味着,我们将继续打击“基地”组织的重要目标,并且打击正在集结起来支持对联军发动攻击的势力。但是,到2014年底,我们将不再需要相同程度的武力保护,我们在打击“基地”组织核心势力上所取得的进展将减少对无人机攻击的需要。
在阿富汗战区外,我们只将“基地”组织及其同伙势力作为打击目标。而且即便如此,也对使用无人机给予严格制约。美国在有能力捕获具体恐怖主义分子时,不会实施打击;我们的首选方式始终是拘留、审问和起诉。美国不会任意在任何地方实施打击;我们的行动受到与合作伙伴磋商以及对国家主权予以尊重的约束。
美国实施打击不是为了惩罚个别人;我们的行动针对的是对美国人民构成持续和迫在眉睫威胁的恐怖主义分子,而且是在其他政府没有能力有效解决这种威胁时才会采取行动。而且,在实施打击之前,我们必须近于完全肯定不会造成平民死亡或受伤——这是我们可以设定的最高标准。
最后这一点至关重要,因为,可以理解,对使用无人机实施打击提出的诸多批评——无论是国内还是国外——都围绕着有关平民伤亡的报告。美国对这类伤亡的评估与非政府方面的报告出入很大。然而,美国的打击造成了平民伤亡是实在的事实,这是所有战争都存在的风险。对于这些平民的家人,任何话语或法律规定都不能构成其损失的正当理由。对于我和我的各层指挥而言,那些亡魂将使我们余生不安,正如在阿富汗和伊拉克常规战争中死伤的平民在折磨着我们一样。
但是作为全军统帅,我必须权衡这些令人心碎的悲剧和其他选择。面对恐怖主义分子网络无所作为将会招致更多平民伤亡——不仅在我们国内的城市和我们在国外的设施,而且就在恐怖主义分子寻求立足的萨那(Sana’a)、喀布尔(Kabul)和摩加迪沙( Mogadishu)等等地方。请记住,我们所追击的恐怖主义分子针对的是平民,与他们针对穆斯林的恐怖活动所造成的死亡人数相比,任何无人机打击造成的估计伤亡人数都相形见绌。因此,无所作为不是我们的选择。
如果外国政府不能或不愿在其领土上有效阻止恐怖主义,那么替代有针对性的致命打击行动的主要选择就是诉诸常规军事打击。正如我已经说过的,即使是小规模特种行动也存在巨大风险。常规空中力量或导弹的精确度远逊于无人机,而且很可能导致更多平民伤亡,引起当地更强烈的义愤。侵入这些领土让别人认为我们是占领军,引发无数不期后果,而且难以控制,导致大量平民伤亡,并且最终助长借暴力冲突发威的势力。
因此,称动用地面部队较不可能造成平民伤亡或较不可能在穆斯林世界树敌是错误的。其结果会让更多美国人丧生,更多“黑鹰”(Black Hawks)被击落,与当地人口发生更多对抗,而且为支持这类袭击而难免扩大的使命很容易会升级为新的战争。
是的,与“基地”组织的冲突,像所有武装冲突那样,会招致悲剧。但是,通过将我们的行动严格限于打击那些想杀害我们的人,而不是恐怖主义分子借以藏身的人群,我们选择的是有最大可能不导致无辜者丧生的行动方案。
我们必须用曾将美国军队派往异国置身在敌对人口的历史来评判我们的努力。在越南,几十万平民在战场界线模糊的战争中丧生。在伊拉克和阿富汗,尽管我们的军队勇气非凡、纪律严明,但仍有数千平民死亡。因此,常规军事行动或者坐等袭击上门都无道义安全可言;在缺乏有效警察或安全力量——而且其实没有有效法律——的领土上仅仅依靠执法功能也行不通。
这不是说没有切实风险。美国在异国土地上的任何军事行动都存在树立更多敌人和影响海外舆论的风险。此外,我们的法律即使在战时也限制总统的权力,我宣过誓要捍卫《合众国宪法》(Constitution of the United States)。无人机的非常精确打击和这类行动经常具有的必要保密性最终可以使政府免受如部署军队则招致的公众审视。它也会使总统及其团队可以将无人机打击视为反恐的万全之计。
因此,我坚持要求对所有致命打击行动进行强有力的监督。在我上任后,本政府开始向相关国会委员会通报在伊拉克和阿富汗之外实施的一切打击行动。我再重申一遍: 使用武力不仅得到了国会的授权,而且美国的每一次打击都向国会通报。每一次打击。这包括我们针对一名美国公民——安瓦尔·奥拉基(Anwar Awlaki)——阿拉伯半岛基地组织对外行动负责人。
本周,我授权对这次行动进行解密,公布了其他三名在无人机打击中丧命的美国人,以促进有关这一问题的透明度和辩论并消解有人提出的稀奇古怪的说法。我郑重声明,我不认为政府不经正当程序攻击并杀害任何美国公民——使用无人机或猎枪——是符合宪法的,任何一位总统也不应将武装无人机部署在美国本土。
但是,当一个美国公民跑到国外发动针对美国的战争,并积极密谋杀害美国公民,而且当美国或我们的合作伙伴无法在其实施阴谋前将其抓获时,他的美国公民身份不应再是他的保护伞,正如一个射杀无辜群众的射手不应受特警队(SWAT team)保护。
这就是安瓦尔·奥拉基的面目——他不断地企图杀人。他帮助监督策划了2010年引爆两架飞往美国的货运飞机上的爆炸装置的阴谋。他曾参与2009年炸毁一架客机的计划。当法鲁克·阿卜杜穆塔拉布(Farouk Abdulmutallab)——“圣诞节爆炸案”主犯——2009年去也门时,奥拉基招待了他,批准了他的自杀行动,帮助他录制了准备在攻击后播放的殉道视频,而且下达了在飞机飞越美国本土时引爆炸弹的最后指令。如果我们在奥拉基执行此策划前抓到他,我本是可以拘留并起诉他,但我们无法做到这点。作为总统,如果我没有授权实施打击将他消灭掉,那就是我的失职。
当然,针对任何美国人的行动会提出其他打击方式不存在的宪法问题——这就是为什么我的政府要在奥拉基被杀前几个月向司法部(Department of Justice)提交与他有关的信息,并且在实施打击前向国会作通报。但是,我们为动用致命打击力量设定了很高的门槛,这适用于所有潜在的恐怖主义分子目标,无论他们是否是美国公民。设定的门槛尊重每个生命固有的尊严。与决定将我们的男女将士送入险境一样,决定对个人或群体动用武力——即使是针对美国的死敌——也是我作为总统最难作出的决定。但是,鉴于我有责任保护美国人民,我必须作出这些决定。
接下来,我已经要求我的政府审议各种方案,以扩大对超出战区范围的致命打击行动的监督,使之不仅限于向国会呈报。每种方案在理论上都有优点,但实践起来却有困难。例如,成立特别法庭来评估和授权致命打击行动具有让政府的第三分支参与决策过程的好处,但带来有关总统权力和司法权力的重大宪法性问题。另一个提出的设想——在行政分支内成立一个独立的监督委员会—可以避免那些问题,但可能使国家安全决策多了一层官僚机制,并且不会增加公众对决策过程的信心。但尽管存在这些挑战,我期待与国会积极协商,探索这些和其他加强监督的方案。
然而我认为,武力的使用必须被视为我们制定全面的反恐战略所需进行的更大规模讨论的一部分——因为尽管有对使用武力的各种关注,但单靠武力并不能保障我们的安全。我们不能在激进意识形态根深蒂固的每一个地方都动用武力;而且,如果缺乏可以削弱极端主义根源的战略,一场无休止的战争——无论通过无人机或特种部队或部署军队——最终将适得其反,并且会以令人担忧的方式改变我们国家。
因此,我们的战略的下一个要点涉及解决滋生极端主义的深层不满和冲突——从北非到南亚。正如我们十年来所认识到的,这是一项庞大而复杂的努力。我们对迅速解决贫困和教派仇恨等根深蒂固的问题的期望必须脚踏实地。此外,没有哪两个国家是相同的,有些国家需要经历动荡的变革后才会出现好转。但是,我们的安全和价值观要求我们必须作出这些努力。
这意味着要耐心地支持埃及、突尼斯和利比亚等地的民主过渡——因为和平地实现个人的理想抱负将是对暴力极端主义分子的反驳。我们必须增强叙利亚的反对派力量,同时孤立极端主义势力——因为一个暴政的终结切不可成为恐怖主义施虐的开始。我们正在积极推动以色列和巴勒斯坦之间的和平——因为这是正确的,而且因为这样的和平有助于给这一地区的态度带来转变。我们还必须帮助有关国家实现经济现代化、提高教育水平并鼓励创业——因为美国一向是通过我们与人们的希望而不是恐惧连接在一起的能力而提高领导作用。
在所有这些方面取得成功需要持续的参与,也将需要种种资源。我知道,对外援助是最不受欢迎的支出项目之一。对民主党和共和党而言都是如此——我已经看到民意调查数据——即便对外援助在联邦预算中还占不到1%。事实上,如果你走上街头去问一问,许多人会认为它占到了25%。其实还不到1%——但仍然大大不受欢迎。然而,对外援助不能被视为施舍。它对我们国家安全具有根本意义,也是任何一项打击极端主义的明智的长期战略的根本。
此外,与我们的战争开支相比,对外援助是极小的一笔开支,而且我们的援助最终有可能防止战争。我们在伊拉克战争高峰时期一个月的支出,可以被用来训练利比亚的安全部队、维护以色列及其邻国之间的和平协议、给也门的饥饿人口提供粮食、在巴基斯坦修建学校以及积累能将极端主义分子边缘化的友好善意。这必须成为我们的战略的一部分。
另外,如果没有在一些非常危险的地方工作的外交人员,美国也无法开展这项工作。在过去十年里,我们加强了我国使馆的安全,而且我正在落实问责审查委员会(Accountability Review Board)的各项建议,委员会指出了在班加西出现的种种不可接受的失误。我已经敦促国会为这些工作全面拨款,以加强安全及加固设施、改善情报工作,并促使我国军队在危机发生时作出更快速的反应。
但是,即使在我们采取这些措施后,我们的外交人员依然会面临一些无法减轻的风险。这是作为全世界最强大的国家所付的代价,尤其是在变革的浪潮冲击阿拉伯世界(Arab World)之际。在权衡保障安全和积极展开外交这两方面时,我坚信任何从具有挑战性的地区撤出的举动只会增加我们所面临的长期风险。这就是为什么我们应当感谢那些愿意为国效力的外交人员。
针对恐怖分子的有的放矢的行动、有效力的伙伴关系、外交接触和援助——通过这样一项全面的战略,我们能够大大减少针对美国本土的大规模攻击发生的机率,并能减轻在海外的美国人所面临的威胁。但是,在我们防范来自国外的危险之时,我们也不能忽视我国境内的恐怖主义所构成的艰巨挑战。
正如我前面说过的,这种威胁并非新生。但是,技术和因特网增加了出现这种威胁的频率,在某些情况下使之更具杀伤力。今天,一个人足不出户就能接触到仇恨宣传,从事暴力谋划,并学会如何行凶。为了应对这种威胁,本政府两年前进行了全面审议并与执法部门建立合作。
防止暴力圣战者煽动暴力极端主义的最佳方式,是与一贯摈弃恐怖主义的美国穆斯林社区共同努力,发现激进化的迹象,并在有人出现暴力倾向时与执法部门合作。这些伙伴关系只有在我们认识到穆斯林是美国大家庭的一个基本组成部分时才会起作用。事实上,美国穆斯林的成功和我们决心保护他们的公民自由不受任何侵犯是对那些声称我们正在与伊斯兰教交战的人的最根本驳斥。
挫败国内滋生的阴谋带有特殊的挑战,其中部分原因在于,我们对保障所有以美国为家的人的民权自由有着自豪的承诺。因此,今后我们必须不断努力,在满足我们的安全需要与保护体现我们本色的各项自由之间取得适当的平衡。这意味着审查执法部门的权能,以使我们既能够拦截新型通讯信息,也建立起防范侵权的对隐私的保护。
这意味着——即使在发生波士顿爆炸案之后——我们也不会在没有证据的情况下将某人驱逐出境或投进监狱。这意味着对政府用来保护敏感信息的工具给予谨慎约束,例如“国家机密原则”(state secrets doctrine)。这意味着最终成立起强有力的隐私和公民自由委员会(Privacy and Civil Liberties Board),审议那些令我们的反恐努力和我们的价值观可能发生冲突的问题。
司法部对国家安全泄密事件的调查就是一个最新实例,体现了我们在安全和开放社会之间取得适当平衡所面临的挑战。作为全军统帅,我认为我们必须保守机密,以保护我们的行动和我们的实地工作人员。要做到这一点,我们必须让那些违反法律并违背保护机密信息的承诺的人承担后果。但是,新闻自由对于我们的民主也至关重要。这就是我们的根本。令我担忧的是,泄密事件调查可能会给向政府问责的调查性新闻报道泼凉水。
新闻记者不应由于从事本职工作而面临法律风险。我们的重点必须放在那些违反法律的人身上。因此,我已敦促国会通过一部媒体保护法,以防政府过度追究。我也已经向司法部长提出这些问题,他与我有相同的关切。因此,他同意审议司法部管理调查工作的现行指导方针中涉及新闻记者的内容,并将在审议过程中召集一批媒体组织,听取他们所关心的问题。我已经指示司法部长在7月12日前向我汇报进展。
所有这些问题提醒我们,我们对于战争作出的选择会影响到——有时会以意想不到的方式——我们的生活方式所依赖的开放和自由。这就是为什么我计划与国会商议现行的《使用军事力量授权》(Authorization to Use Military Force),简称AUMF,以确定我们怎样才能继续打击恐怖主义,同时不让美国处于永久战时状态。
《使用军事力量授权》已实行了近12年之久。阿富汗战争即将结束。“基地”组织的核心已是徒有其名。我们必须应对诸如阿拉伯半岛基地组织等团伙,但是未来并非每一个自称是“基地”组织的暴徒团伙都会给美国带来切实威胁。我们必须严格把握我们的思维、定义和行动,否则我们就可能被卷入我们无需参与的更多的战争,或继续授予总统更适用于民族国家间的传统武装冲突的无限权力。
因此,我期待与美国国会和美国人民一道改进并最终废止《使用军事力量授权》的规定。我将不会签署旨在进一步扩大此项授权的法律。我们瓦解恐怖主义组织的系统性努力必须继续。但这场战争与所有战争一样必将结束。 这是历史的教诲;这是我们民主制度的要求。
由此引出我要谈的最后一点:拘押恐怖主义嫌疑分子的问题。我要再重申一遍: 从政策上讲,美国更倾向于抓获恐怖主义嫌疑分子。当我们确实拘捕了恐怖主义嫌疑分子时,我们会对他们进行审讯。如果能对嫌疑分子提出起诉,我们会决定是通过民事法庭还是特别军事法庭对其进行审判。
过去十年间,绝大多数被我军拘押的恐怖主义嫌疑人都是在战场上被俘。在伊拉克,我们在结束战争时向伊拉克当局移交了数千名囚犯。在阿富汗,作为恢复阿富汗主权进程中的一个步骤,我们将拘押设施移交给阿富汗政府。我们以此终止战争拘押法,并致力于在任何能够起诉恐怖主义分子的地方起诉他们。
对这个经过时间检验的方法,一个显著例外是关塔那摩湾(Guantanamo Bay)的拘押中心。开设关塔纳摩设施的最初理由——被拘押者不能对受拘押提出质疑——在五年前被裁定违宪。与此同时,在世界各地,关塔纳摩成为美国藐视法治的象征。我们的盟友如果认为一名恐怖主义分子最终会被关进关塔纳摩,就不会与我们合作。
在预算削减的情况下,我们关押166名囚犯每年花费1.5亿美元,即几乎每名囚犯100万美元。国防部估计,我们还必须再投入2亿美元维持关塔纳摩,与此同时我们正在削减对美国国内教育和研究的投入,五角大楼也在努力克服自动减支和预算削减造成的困难。
作为总统,我曾努力关闭关塔纳摩。在国会施加有关限制进而实际让我们无法将被拘押者转送其他国家或在美国囚禁之前,我已将67名被拘押者转交给其他国家。
这些限制没有任何意义。毕竟,在布什总统(President Bush)任职期间,在国会的支持下,曾有530名被拘押者被从关塔纳摩转移到其他地方。在我第一次竞选总统期间,约翰·麦凯恩(John McCain)支持关闭关塔纳摩——这是一个两党一致的问题。从来没有人从美国哪个防守超级严密的监狱或军事监狱逃跑——从来没有。我们的法院宣判了数百名犯有恐怖主义罪行或与恐怖主义相关罪行的人,其中一些人远比大多数被关押在关塔纳摩的人更危险。他们现在都在我们的狱中。
鉴于本届政府坚持不懈地追捕“基地”组织头目,在政治因素以外,国会没有任何理由阻止我们关闭本来就不该设立的关塔纳摩设施。(掌声。)
听众: 抱歉,奥巴马总统——
总统: 让我说完,女士,今天,再次——
听众: 有102人绝食抗议。他们都很绝望。
总统: 我将谈到这个问题,女士,但是你得让我说话。我即将谈到这个问题。
听众: 你是我们的统帅——
总统: 请让我谈这个问题。
听众:——你可以关闭关塔纳摩湾。
总统: 你为什么不让我谈这个问题,女士。
听众: 那里仍关押犯——
总统: 你可以坐下来,我会详细告诉你我将怎么做。
听众: 其中包括 57 名也门人。
总统: 谢谢你,女士,谢谢你。(掌声) 女士,谢谢你。你应该让我说完。
今天,我再次呼吁国会对转移关塔纳摩被拘押者一事解除施加的限制。(掌声)
我已要求国防部在美国境内指定一处可以设立特别军事法庭的地方。我正在任命新的国务院和国防部高级特使,其唯一的职责将是完成将被拘押者转移至第三国。
我将解除向也门转移被拘押者的禁令,这将使我们可以逐一进行个案审议。我们会尽最大的可能转移已获准前往其他国家的被拘押者。
听众:——囚犯已经。今天就释放他们。
总统: 我们会在适当的情况下通过我们的法院和军事司法系统将恐怖主义分子绳之以法。我们将坚持每一名被拘押者都得到司法审理。
听众: 这需要——
总统:女士,请让我说完。请让我说完,女士。言论自由一方面意味着你有权利发言,但另一方面也意味着你应当倾听,让我能够说话。(掌声)
现在,甚至在我们采取这些措施后,依然存在的一个问题是——如何处理关塔纳摩的某些被拘押者,我们知道他们参与了危险的策划或攻击活动,但因证据受损或按法院规定不得采用等原因而无法受到起诉。但是我们一旦致力于逐步关闭关塔纳摩,我相信我们会根据我们对法治的承诺解决这个遗留问题。
我知道有艰难的政治因素。但是,历史将会对我们在打击恐怖主义中这方面的作为以及我们当中未能将其关闭的人作出无情的评判。试想一下未来的情况—— 10 年或 20 年后——美利坚合众国仍在不属于我国的土地上关押着未被判罪的人。看看眼前的情形,对于正在绝食抗议的被拘押者,我们在强迫进食。对于打断我讲话的年轻女士,我愿意表示理解,因为值得为之动情。我们是这样的人吗? 这是我们的开国元勋所预见的吗?这是我们希望留给孩子们的美国吗? 我们有着比这更强的正义感。
我们已经在我们的法院起诉了许多恐怖主义分子, 其中包括企图在底特律(Detroit)上空炸毁飞机的奥马尔·法鲁克·阿卜杜勒·穆塔拉布(Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab);在时报广场(Times Square)放置汽车炸弹的费萨尔·沙赫扎德(Faisal Shahzad)。我们将通过法庭审判被控在波士顿马拉松赛中引爆炸弹的佐哈尔·萨尔马耶夫(Dzhokhar Tsarnaev)。此时此刻,制造鞋子炸弹事件的恐怖主义分子理查德·里德(Richard Reid)正在美国安全措施最严密的监狱中服无期徒刑。法官威廉·杨(William Young)在对里德进行宣判时告诉他,“我们对待你的方式……是我们本身自由的尺度。”
听众:那么阿卜杜勒·穆塔拉布(Abdulmutallab)呢—— 囚禁一名16岁的孩子—— 这是我们对待一名16岁的孩子的方式吗? (听不清)—— 你能不让中央情报局接触无人机吗? 你能停止仅根据可疑活动而杀人的标志性打击吗?
总统: 我们正在谈这个问题,女士。
听众:——数千名穆斯林被杀——你会对无辜的家庭提供赔偿吗——这会让我们在美国国内感到更安全。我热爱我的国家, 我热爱(听不清)——
总统: 我认为——我将脱离讲稿,你们现在可以料到。(笑声和掌声) 那位女士的话值得重视。(掌声) 显然,我不同意她的很多看法,显然,她没有听进我说的大部分话。但是这些都是棘手的问题,认为我们可以掩饰过关是不正确的。
那名法官在对制造鞋子炸弹事件的里德先生宣判时,指着法庭内的美国国旗说:“即使在这一切早已经被人们遗忘以后,这面旗帜仍会继续在此飘扬。这面旗帜仍将是自由的象征。”
因此,美国,我们征服过远比“基地”组织大得多的危险。通过坚持我们的建国价值观并以我国宪法为指南,我们战胜了奴隶制,南北战争分裂,法西斯主义和共产主义。就在近几年,作为总统,我亲眼目睹了美国人民从痛苦的经济衰退、大规模枪击事件以及最近给俄克拉荷马州(Oklahoma)造成巨大破坏的龙卷风等自然灾害中重新振作起来。这些事件令人痛心;给我们的社区带来重创。但是,由于美国人民坚忍不拔的意志,这些事件根本不可能将我们摧毁。
我想到9/11事件幸存者劳伦·曼宁(Lauren Manning)——她身上严重烧伤的面积超过80%——她说:“这是我的现实, 我贴上创可贴,名副其实地,继续前进。”
我想到纽约人,在未遂汽车爆炸第二天,时报广场依然人潮如涌,好像什么事情都没发生过一样。
我想到一对骄傲的巴基斯坦父母,他们在女儿被邀请参观白宫后写信给我。信中说,“我们养育了一个美籍穆斯林女儿,让她怀抱远大理想,永不放弃,因为这的确值得。”
我想到所有受伤的将士,他们在重建自己的生活,并在帮助其他退伍军人寻找工作。
我想到计划参加2014年波士顿马拉松赛的那位运动员。他说,“明年,参赛人数会高于以往任何时候。人志不可辱。”
这就是美国人民 —— 坚毅刚强,志不可辱。现在,我们需要有一个体现这种坚韧不拔精神的战略与政治。
我们打击恐怖主义的胜利将不是通过在战舰上举行受降仪式或将一尊雕像推倒在地来体现。这一胜利将体现在父母送孩子上学;移民进入我国口岸;球迷们观看比赛;退伍军人创办企业;一条熙熙攘攘的城市街道;一位为表达她的关注而向总统大声呼叫的公民。
沉着坚定、性格的力量和同胞的情谊;对恐惧的无所畏惧——这既是我们的利剑,也是我们的盾牌。在当前的仇恨传播者——连同残酷的暴君、疯癫的狂人和遗臭历史的喋喋不休的摇唇者——早已从世人记忆中消失后,美国国旗仍将继续在乡镇墓地、国家纪念陵园直至遥远的海外前哨飘扬。这面旗帜仍将是自由的象征。
非常感谢各位。上帝保佑你们。上帝保佑美利坚合众国。(掌声)
结束
美国东部夏令时间下午3:00
National Defense University
Fort McNair
Washington, D.C.
2:01 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, everybody. Please be seated.
It is a great honor to return to the National Defense University. Here, at Fort McNair, Americans have served in uniform since 1791 -- standing guard in the earliest days of the Republic, and contemplating the future of warfare here in the 21st century.
For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that defined who we are as Americans, and served as our compass through every type of change. Matters of war and peace are no different. Americans are deeply ambivalent about war, but having fought for our independence, we know a price must be paid for freedom. From the Civil War to our struggle against fascism, on through the long twilight struggle of the Cold War, battlefields have changed and technology has evolved. But our commitment to constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end.
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad, and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived here at home. And for a moment, it seemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. And then, on September 11, 2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us, as clouds of fire and metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning. This was a different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could.
And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade. I won’t review the full history. What is clear is that we quickly drove al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, but then shifted our focus and began a new war in Iraq. And this carried significant consequences for our fight against al Qaeda, our standing in the world, and -- to this day -- our interests in a vital region.
Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses -- hardening targets, tightening transportation security, giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror. Most of these changes were sound. Some caused inconvenience. But some, like expanded surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance that we strike between our interests in security and our values of privacy. And in some cases, I believe we compromised our basic values -- by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law.
So after I took office, we stepped up the war against al Qaeda but we also sought to change its course. We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s leadership. We ended the war in Iraq, and brought nearly 150,000 troops home. We pursued a new strategy in Afghanistan, and increased our training of Afghan forces. We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the rule of law, and expanded our consultations with Congress.
Today, Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure. Fewer of our troops are in harm’s way, and over the next 19 months they will continue to come home. Our alliances are strong, and so is our standing in the world. In sum, we are safer because of our efforts.
Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we have to recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a decade of experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard questions -- about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront them.
And these questions matter to every American.
For over the last decade, our nation has spent well over a trillion dollars on war, helping to explode our deficits and constraining our ability to nation-build here at home. Our servicemembers and their families have sacrificed far more on our behalf. Nearly 7,000 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many more have left a part of themselves on the battlefield, or brought the shadows of battle back home. From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions that we are making now will define the type of nation -- and world -- that we leave to our children.
So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that “No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do -- what we must do -- is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. And to define that strategy, we have to make decisions based not on fear, but on hard-earned wisdom. That begins with understanding the current threat that we face.
Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They’ve not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.
Instead, what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with Al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula -- AQAP -- the most active in plotting against our homeland. And while none of AQAP’s efforts approach the scale of 9/11, they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.
Unrest in the Arab world has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and Syria. But here, too, there are differences from 9/11. In some cases, we continue to confront state-sponsored networks like Hezbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Other of these groups are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. And while we are vigilant for signs that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. And that means we’ll face more localized threats like what we saw in Benghazi, or the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives -- perhaps in loose affiliation with regional networks -- launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies, and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations.
And finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States. Whether it’s a shooter at a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin, a plane flying into a building in Texas, or the extremists who killed 168 people at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, America has confronted many forms of violent extremism in our history. Deranged or alienated individuals -- often U.S. citizens or legal residents -- can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent jihad. And that pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood and the bombing of the Boston Marathon.
So that’s the current threat -- lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates; threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad; homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We have to take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.
In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our Embassy in Beirut; at our Marine Barracks in Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; and on a Pan Am flight -- Flight 103 -- over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center; at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia; and at our Embassy in Kenya. These attacks were all brutal; they were all deadly; and we learned that left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11.
Moreover, we have to recognize that these threats don’t arise in a vacuum. Most, though not all, of the terrorism we faced is fueled by a common ideology -- a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West, and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam. And this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks.
Nevertheless, this ideology persists, and in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas. So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.
First, we must finish the work of defeating al Qaeda and its associated forces.
In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for that country’s security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force, which ensures that al Qaeda can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.
Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless “global war on terror,” but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America. In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries. Already, thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists. In Yemen, we are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP. In Somalia, we helped a coalition of African nations push al-Shabaab out of its strongholds. In Mali, we’re providing military aid to French-led intervention to push back al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and help the people of Mali reclaim their future.
Much of our best counterterrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing of intelligence, the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. And that’s how a Somali terrorist apprehended off the coast of Yemen is now in a prison in New York. That’s how we worked with European allies to disrupt plots from Denmark to Germany to the United Kingdom. That’s how intelligence collected with Saudi Arabia helped us stop a cargo plane from being blown up over the Atlantic. These partnerships work.
But despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth. They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains.
In some of these places -- such as parts of Somalia and Yemen -- the state only has the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity or will to take action. And it’s also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. Even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians -- where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with surrounding tribal communities, for example, that pose no threat to us; times when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis.
To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case were immense. The likelihood of capture, although that was our preference, was remote given the certainty that our folks would confront resistance. The fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an extended firefight, was a testament to the meticulous planning and professionalism of our Special Forces, but it also depended on some luck. And it was supported by massive infrastructure in Afghanistan.
And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan -- and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory -- was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership.
So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.
As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions -- about who is targeted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law; about accountability and morality. So let me address these questions.
To begin with, our actions are effective. Don’t take my word for it. In the intelligence gathered at bin Laden’s compound, we found that he wrote, “We could lose the reserves to enemy’s air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives.” Other communications from al Qaeda operatives confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.
Moreover, America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war -- a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.
And yet, as our fight enters a new phase, America’s legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance. For the same human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power -- or risk abusing it. And that’s why, over the last four years, my administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists –- insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance that I signed yesterday.
In the Afghan war theater, we must -- and will -- continue to support our troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. And that means we will continue to take strikes against high value al Qaeda targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces. But by the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we’ve made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.
Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces. And even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute. America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty.
America does not take strikes to punish individuals; we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured -- the highest standard we can set.
Now, this last point is critical, because much of the criticism about drone strikes -- both here at home and abroad -- understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There’s a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports. Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in every war. And for the families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify their loss. For me, and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live, just as we are haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred throughout conventional fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties -- not just in our cities at home and our facilities abroad, but also in the very places like Sana’a and Kabul and Mogadishu where terrorists seek a foothold. Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes. So doing nothing is not an option.
Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their territory, the primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of conventional military options. As I’ve already said, even small special operations carry enormous risks. Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage. And invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences, are difficult to contain, result in large numbers of civilian casualties and ultimately empower those who thrive on violent conflict.
So it is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.
Yes, the conflict with al Qaeda, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy. But by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life.
Our efforts must be measured against the history of putting American troops in distant lands among hostile populations. In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred. In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the extraordinary courage and discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have been killed. So neither conventional military action nor waiting for attacks to occur offers moral safe harbor, and neither does a sole reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or security services -- and indeed, have no functioning law.
Now, this is not to say that the risks are not real. Any U.S. military action in foreign lands risks creating more enemies and impacts public opinion overseas. Moreover, our laws constrain the power of the President even during wartime, and I have taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. The very precision of drone strikes and the necessary secrecy often involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.
And for this reason, I’ve insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action. After I took office, my administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat that: Not only did Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every strike that America takes. Every strike. That includes the one instance when we targeted an American citizen -- Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operations for AQAP.
This week, I authorized the declassification of this action, and the deaths of three other Americans in drone strikes, to facilitate transparency and debate on this issue and to dismiss some of the more outlandish claims that have been made. For the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen -- with a drone, or with a shotgun -- without due process, nor should any President deploy armed drones over U.S. soil.
But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States, nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT team.
That’s who Anwar Awlaki was -- he was continuously trying to kill people. He helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S.-bound cargo planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009. When Farouk Abdulmutallab -- the Christmas Day bomber -- went to Yemen in 2009, Awlaki hosted him, approved his suicide operation, helped him tape a martyrdom video to be shown after the attack, and his last instructions were to blow up the airplane when it was over American soil. I would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot, but we couldn’t. And as President, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took him out.
Of course, the targeting of any American raises constitutional issues that are not present in other strikes -- which is why my administration submitted information about Awlaki to the Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed, and briefed the Congress before this strike as well. But the high threshold that we’ve set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent dignity of every human life. Alongside the decision to put our men and women in uniform in harm’s way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups -- even against a sworn enemy of the United States -- is the hardest thing I do as President. But these decisions must be made, given my responsibility to protect the American people.
Going forward, I’ve asked my administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond our reporting to Congress. Each option has virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process, but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority. Another idea that’s been suggested -- the establishment of an independent oversight board in the executive branch -- avoids those problems, but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national security decision-making, without inspiring additional public confidence in the process. But despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging Congress to explore these and other options for increased oversight.
I believe, however, that the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy -- because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war -- through drones or Special Forces or troop deployments -- will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in troubling ways.
So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism -- from North Africa to South Asia. As we’ve learned this past decade, this is a vast and complex undertaking. We must be humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolve deep-rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred. Moreover, no two countries are alike, and some will undergo chaotic change before things get better. But our security and our values demand that we make the effort.
This means patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt and Tunisia and Libya -- because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will serve as a rebuke to violent extremists. We must strengthen the opposition in Syria, while isolating extremist elements -- because the end of a tyrant must not give way to the tyranny of terrorism. We are actively working to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians -- because it is right and because such a peace could help reshape attitudes in the region. And we must help countries modernize economies, upgrade education, and encourage entrepreneurship -- because American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with people’s hopes, and not simply their fears.
And success on all these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will also require resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular expenditures that there is. That’s true for Democrats and Republicans -- I’ve seen the polling -- even though it amounts to less than one percent of the federal budget. In fact, a lot of folks think it’s 25 percent, if you ask people on the streets. Less than one percent -- still wildly unpopular. But foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our national security. And it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism.
Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent. For what we spent in a month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training security forces in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in Pakistan, and creating reservoirs of goodwill that marginalize extremists. That has to be part of our strategy.
Moreover, America cannot carry out this work if we don’t have diplomats serving in some very dangerous places. Over the past decade, we have strengthened security at our embassies, and I am implementing every recommendation of the Accountability Review Board, which found unacceptable failures in Benghazi. I’ve called on Congress to fully fund these efforts to bolster security and harden facilities, improve intelligence, and facilitate a quicker response time from our military if a crisis emerges.
But even after we take these steps, some irreducible risks to our diplomats will remain. This is the price of being the world’s most powerful nation, particularly as a wave of change washes over the Arab World. And in balancing the trade4offs between security and active diplomacy, I firmly believe that any retreat from challenging regions will only increase the dangers that we face in the long run. And that’s why we should be grateful to those diplomats who are willing to serve.
Targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic engagement and assistance -- through such a comprehensive strategy we can significantly reduce the chances of large-scale attacks on the homeland and mitigate threats to Americans overseas. But as we guard against dangers from abroad, we cannot neglect the daunting challenge of terrorism from within our borders.
As I said earlier, this threat is not new. But technology and the Internet increase its frequency and in some cases its lethality. Today, a person can consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to a violent agenda, and learn how to kill without leaving their home. To address this threat, two years ago my administration did a comprehensive review and engaged with law enforcement.
And the best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists is to work with the Muslim American community -- which has consistently rejected terrorism -- to identify signs of radicalization and partner with law enforcement when an individual is drifting towards violence. And these partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a fundamental part of the American family. In fact, the success of American Muslims and our determination to guard against any encroachments on their civil liberties is the ultimate rebuke to those who say that we’re at war with Islam.
Thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because of our proud commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home. That’s why, in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities of law enforcement, so we can intercept new types of communication, but also build in privacy protections to prevent abuse.
That means that -- even after Boston -- we do not deport someone or throw somebody in prison in the absence of evidence. That means putting careful constraints on the tools the government uses to protect sensitive information, such as the state secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a strong Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to review those issues where our counterterrorism efforts and our values may come into tension.
The Justice Department’s investigation of national security leaks offers a recent example of the challenges involved in striking the right balance between our security and our open society. As Commander-in-Chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field. To do so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their commitment to protect classified information. But a free press is also essential for our democracy. That’s who we are. And I’m troubled by the possibility that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government accountable.
Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs. Our focus must be on those who break the law. And that’s why I’ve called on Congress to pass a media shield law to guard against government overreach. And I’ve raised these issues with the Attorney General, who shares my concerns. So he has agreed to review existing Department of Justice guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters, and he’ll convene a group of media organizations to hear their concerns as part of that review. And I’ve directed the Attorney General to report back to me by July 12th.
Now, all these issues remind us that the choices we make about war can impact -- in sometimes unintended ways -- the openness and freedom on which our way of life depends. And that is why I intend to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing.
The AUMF is now nearly 12 years old. The Afghan war is coming to an end. Core al Qaeda is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States. Unless we discipline our thinking, our definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight, or continue to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation states.
So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our democracy demands.
And that brings me to my final topic: the detention of terrorist suspects. I’m going to repeat one more time: As a matter of policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects. When we do detain a suspect, we interrogate them. And if the suspect can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian court or a military commission.
During the past decade, the vast majority of those detained by our military were captured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we turned over thousands of prisoners as we ended the war. In Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the Afghans, as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bring law of war detention to an end, and we are committed to prosecuting terrorists wherever we can.
The glaring exception to this time-tested approach is the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. The original premise for opening GTMO -- that detainees would not be able to challenge their detention -- was found unconstitutional five years ago. In the meantime, GTMO has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law. Our allies won’t cooperate with us if they think a terrorist will end up at GTMO.
During a time of budget cuts, we spend $150 million each year to imprison 166 people -- almost $1 million per prisoner. And the Department of Defense estimates that we must spend another $200 million to keep GTMO open at a time when we’re cutting investments in education and research here at home, and when the Pentagon is struggling with sequester and budget cuts.
As President, I have tried to close GTMO. I transferred 67 detainees to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively prevent us from either transferring detainees to other countries or imprisoning them here in the United States.
These restrictions make no sense. After all, under President Bush, some 530 detainees were transferred from GTMO with Congress’s support. When I ran for President the first time, John McCain supported closing GTMO -- this was a bipartisan issue. No person has ever escaped one of our super-max or military prisons here in the United States -- ever. Our courts have convicted hundreds of people for terrorism or terrorism-related offenses, including some folks who are more dangerous than most GTMO detainees. They’re in our prisons.
And given my administration’s relentless pursuit of al Qaeda’s leadership, there is no justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from closing a facility that should have never have been opened. (Applause.)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Excuse me, President Obama --
THE PRESIDENT: So -- let me finish, ma’am. So today, once again --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There are 102 people on a hunger strike. These are desperate people.
THE PRESIDENT: I’m about to address it, ma’am, but you’ve got to let me speak. I’m about to address it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You’re our Commander-In-Chief --
THE PRESIDENT: Let me address it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- you an close Guantanamo Bay.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you let me address it, ma’am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There’s still prisoners --
THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you sit down and I will tell you exactly what I’m going to do.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That includes 57 Yemenis.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, ma’am. Thank you. (Applause.) Ma’am, thank you. You should let me finish my sentence.
Today, I once again call on Congress to lift the restrictions on detainee transfers from GTMO. (Applause.)
I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States where we can hold military commissions. I’m appointing a new senior envoy at the State Department and Defense Department whose sole responsibility will be to achieve the transfer of detainees to third countries.
I am lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen so we can review them on a case-by-case basis. To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- prisoners already. Release them today.
THE PRESIDENT: Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts and our military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available for every detainee.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It needs to be --
THE PRESIDENT: Now, ma’am, let me finish. Let me finish, ma’am. Part of free speech is you being able to speak, but also, you listening and me being able to speak. (Applause.)
Now, even after we take these steps one issue will remain -- just how to deal with those GTMO detainees who we know have participated in dangerous plots or attacks but who cannot be prosecuted, for example, because the evidence against them has been compromised or is inadmissible in a court of law. But once we commit to a process of closing GTMO, I am confident that this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.
I know the politics are hard. But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our fight against terrorism and those of us who fail to end it. Imagine a future -- 10 years from now or 20 years from now -- when the United States of America is still holding people who have been charged with no crime on a piece of land that is not part of our country. Look at the current situation, where we are force-feeding detainees who are being held on a hunger strike. I’m willing to cut the young lady who interrupted me some slack because it’s worth being passionate about. Is this who we are? Is that something our Founders foresaw? Is that the America we want to leave our children? Our sense of justice is stronger than that.
We have prosecuted scores of terrorists in our courts. That includes Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit; and Faisal Shahzad, who put a car bomb in Times Square. It’s in a court of law that we will try Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is accused of bombing the Boston Marathon. Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, is, as we speak, serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison here in the United States. In sentencing Reid, Judge William Young told him, “The way we treat you…is the measure of our own liberties.”
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about Abdulmutallab -- locking up a 16-year-old -- is that the way we treat a 16-year old? (Inaudible) -- can you take the drones out of the hands of the CIA? Can you stop the signature strikes killing people on the basis of suspicious activities?
THE PRESIDENT: We’re addressing that, ma’am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- thousands of Muslims that got killed -- will you compensate the innocent families -- that will make us safer here at home. I love my country. I love (inaudible) --
THE PRESIDENT: I think that -- and I’m going off script, as you might expect here. (Laughter and applause.) The voice of that woman is worth paying attention to. (Applause.) Obviously, I do not agree with much of what she said, and obviously she wasn’t listening to me in much of what I said. But these are tough issues, and the suggestion that we can gloss over them is wrong.
When that judge sentenced Mr. Reid, the shoe bomber, he went on to point to the American flag that flew in the courtroom. “That flag,” he said, “will fly there long after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom.”
So, America, we’ve faced down dangers far greater than al Qaeda. By staying true to the values of our founding, and by using our constitutional compass, we have overcome slavery and Civil War and fascism and communism. In just these last few years as President, I’ve watched the American people bounce back from painful recession, mass shootings, natural disasters like the recent tornados that devastated Oklahoma. These events were heartbreaking; they shook our communities to the core. But because of the resilience of the American people, these events could not come close to breaking us.
I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent of her body, who said, “That’s my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I move on.”
I think of the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car bomb as if nothing had happened.
I think of the proud Pakistani parents who, after their daughter was invited to the White House, wrote to us, “We have raised an American Muslim daughter to dream big and never give up because it does pay off.”
I think of all the wounded warriors rebuilding their lives, and helping other vets to find jobs.
I think of the runner planning to do the 2014 Boston Marathon, who said, “Next year, you’re going to have more people than ever. Determination is not something to be messed with.”
That’s who the American people are -- determined, and not to be messed with. And now we need a strategy and a politics that reflects this resilient spirit.
Our victory against terrorism won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony at a battleship, or a statue being pulled to the ground. Victory will be measured in parents taking their kids to school; immigrants coming to our shores; fans taking in a ballgame; a veteran starting a business; a bustling city street; a citizen shouting her concerns at a President.
The quiet determination; that strength of character and bond of fellowship; that refutation of fear -- that is both our sword and our shield. And long after the current messengers of hate have faded from the world’s memory, alongside the brutal despots, and deranged madmen, and ruthless demagogues who litter history -- the flag of the United States will still wave from small-town cemeteries to national monuments, to distant outposts abroad. And that flag will still stand for freedom.
Thank you very, everybody. God bless you. May God bless the United States of America. (Applause.)
3:00 P.M. EDT